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Antitrust and Patent Law Analysis
of Pharmaceutical Reverse Payment Settlements
Herbert Hovenkamp*

So-called “reverse” payments occur when a patentee and infringement
defendant settle infringement litigation with an arrangement under which the
patentee pays the alleged infringer to stay out of the market for the period of time
covered by the settlement.1 Terms such as “pay for delay” may be more
descriptive than the term “reverse payment.”2
Suppose that a widget patentee observes incipient competition from a rival
producer and files an infringement action. This lawsuit could be settled by (1) the
infringement defendant's purchase of an exclusive or nonexclusive license from
the patentee, followed by the defendant's production under the license; or (2) the
infringement plaintiff's purchase from the defendant of a promise that the
defendant abandon its entry plans. Alternative (1) brings a new rival into the
market. It can bring production closer to the competitive level, depending on
whether the license is price- or quantity-restricted. It can also encourage further
innovation in the market by giving two companies an incentive to improve on the
widget. By contrast, alternative (2) keeps the rival out of the market and induces
it to drop its suit in exchange for a payment. There are competitive reasons for
favoring inclusive rather than exclusive settlements. Outside the context of the
Hatch-Waxman Act and pharmaceutical patent disputes, settlements of the
second type are very rare.
Settlement agreements that involve a reverse payment plus the infringement
defendant's abandonment of the market do not involve a license of any IP right at
all. If the dispute is settled by a payment from the defendant to the plaintiff in
exchange for the defendant's right to produce under the patent, the settlement is
a license. Most IP settlements result in the creation of a license, and the proper
scope of such licenses is a legitimate IP concern. By contrast, if the dispute is
settled by the infringement plaintiff's payment to the defendant to stay out of the
market, there is no license, and thus the policy of the Patent Act encouraging
licensing is not invoked. This fact justifies closer scrutiny of exit payments.
Potentially anticompetitive IP settlements are entitled to deference when they
involve the creation of IP licenses whose scope must be assessed against
competitive risks. But when no license is created, no such deference is needed.3

*

Ben V. & Dorothy Willie Professor, University of Iowa College of Law
See 12 Herbert Hovenkamp, Antitrust Law ¶2046c (2d ed. 2005).
2
See, e.g., C. Scott Hemphill, Paying for Delay: Pharmaceutical Patent Settlement as a
Regulatory Design Problem , 81 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1553 (2006).
3
Cf. Aronson v. Quick Point Pencil Co., 440 U.S. 257 (1979) (agreement requiring royalty
payments on patent that never issued could not be patent “misuse,” for one cannot misuse a
nonexistent patent; distinguishing Brulotte v. Thys Co., 379 U.S. 29 (1964), which found misuse
1

1
Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1741162

Hovenkamp

Reverse Payment Settlements

Jan. 2011, page 2

For example, we would not permit parties to settle an ordinary breach of contract
dispute by an agreement fixing their prices or dividing their markets.4 To be sure,
this observation does not completely settle the issue. If a patent is valid and
infringed, then the infringement defendant can be excluded without the need for
the payment, and the settlement merely produces that result.
In a perfectly functioning market with no transaction costs, a monopoly
producer would very likely be indifferent as to producing everything itself or
simply licensing another to make part of its production. The license fee would be
the monopoly markup, output would remain at the monopoly level as it would in
any perfect cartel agreement, and the monopolist would earn the same profits,
although part of those profits would be paid as license fees rather than as
markup on goods that the monopolist produced.
If all parties were completely certain that a patent was valid and infringed, a
patentee could either produce all output under the patent itself, or it could license
some output to a rival, earning its part of its profits as royalties rather than on
sales of the patented product.5 However, assuming zero transaction costs, a firm
in that position would have no incentive whatsoever to pay another firm to stay
out of the market. Given its patent, it could exclude without paying anything at all.
This fact may explain why historically nearly all licensing agreements involve
licenses given to the infringement defendant contemplating actual production, not
exit payments. The exit payment necessarily reduces the patentee's surplus; the
license reduces the surplus only if the licensee fee extracts less than the full
monopoly rent from the licensee.
Transaction costs change the picture somewhat. First, if winning an
infringement suit and obtaining an injunction cost $1 million, then the patentee
might be willing to pay the infringement defendant up to that amount to stay out
of the market, because the cost of the settlement would be lower than the cost of
an injunction achieving the same result. Of course, the settlement would not
resolve questions about the patent's validity or coverage while the court's
judgment might, making the settlement less valuable.6

when the patent had issued and the contract required royalty payments extending beyond the
patent's term; see 10 Antitrust Law ¶1782c5 (3d ed. 2011, forthcoming).
4
For example, if A was a dominant firm and potential rival B owed A a large sum of money,
the parties would not be permitted to settle their dispute with an agreement that A would forgive
the debt in exchange for B's promise to stay out of the market. In such a case no IP rights are at
issue and the “settlement” is a naked market-division agreement.
5
Cf. Intel Corp. v. ITC, 946 F.2d 821(Fed. Cir. 1991), where Intel owned a patent on a
processor chip but hired Sanyo as its “foundry,” or “subcontractor” to produce patents under its
license.
6
While a court's judgment of validity and infringement would not bind non-parties, the
decision could nevertheless have a significant impact on future entrants into the patentee's
market.
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Reverse payment settlements are almost entirely a consequence of the
Hatch-Waxman Act.7 Mainly, the Act is designed to facilitate the entry of generic
drugs by providing the first generic drug maker to challenge a pioneer drug
patent and enter the market with a 180 day period of exclusivity. This period
applies during the pendency of the settlement even if the generic is not
producing, creating a situation that only the pioneer continues to produce the
drug. Under subsequent statutory amendments the generic loses the 180 day
exclusivity period if it does not produce and market its generic within sventy-five
days of approval of its abbreviated drug application to the FDA (ANDA) and
within thirty months of its initial filing.8 However, no other generic is entitled to
the 180 day exclusivity period, so that particular incentive to enter the market
with a generic equivalent is lost.9
At this writing the Circuit Courts of Appeal are in a three way split over the
antitrust legality of so-called “reverse payment” settlements. The Sixth Circuit
has declared them unlawful per se.10 The Second Circuit and the Federal Circuit
(applying Second Circuit law) conclude that they are legal per se provided that
the patent infringement litigation leading up to the settlement was not a “sham”
and the settlement does not reach beyond the scope of the patent.11 The
7

In particular, 21 U.S.C. §355(j). See also ; and see Pub. L. No. 98-417, 98 Stat. 1585
(codified mainly in 21 U.S.C.). See Michael A. Carrier, Unsettling Drug Patent Settlements: A
Framework for Presumptive Illegality, 108 Mich.L.Rev. 37 (2009) (arguing for presumptive
antitrust illegality); Joseph Farrell & Carl Shapiro, How Strong are Weak Patents?, 98 Am. Econ.
Rev. (2008) (similar); C. Scott Hemphill, Paying for Delay: Pharmaceutical Patent Settlement as
a Regulatory Design Problem, 81 NYU L.Rev. 1553 (2006) (similar). Cf. Daniel A. Crane, Exit
Payments in Settlement of Patent Infringement Lawsuits: Antitrust Rules and Economic
Implications, 54 Fla.L.Rev. 747 (2002) (similar); Roger D. Blair & Thomas F. Cotter, Are
Settlements of Patent Disputes Illegal Per Se?”, 47 Antitrust Bull. 491 (2002) (similar); David W.
Opderbeck, Rational Antitrust Policy and Reverse Payment Settlements in Hatch-Waxman Patent
Litigation, 98 Geo.L.J. 1303 ( 2010) (similar).
8
21 U.S.C. §355(j)(5)(D)(i)(I).
9
The entire regulatory procedure is succinctly described in C. Scott Hemphill, An Aggregate
Approach to Antitrust: Using New Data and Rulemaking to Preserve Drug Competition, 109
COLUM. L. REV. 629 (2009). See also MICHAEL A. CARRIER, INNOVATION FOR THE 21ST
CENTURY: HARNESSING THE POWER OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND ANTITRUST LAW 345–71
(2009).
10
Cardizem CD Antitrust Litig., 332 F.3d 896 (6th Cir. 2003). See also Schering Plough
Corp., No. 9297 (F.T.C. Dec. 18, 2003), rev’d, 402 F.3d 1056 (11th Cir. 2005) (FTC’s view that
such settlements are presumptively unlawful, reversed by Eleventh Circuit’s rule of reason
approach).
11
Tamoxifen Citrate Antitrust Litig., 466 F.3d 187, 212-213 (2d Cir. 2006); Arkansas
Carpenters’ Health and Welfare Fund v Bayer AG, 604 F.3d 98 (2d Cir. 2010), pet. for cert.
filed, 79 USLW 3370 (Dec 06, 2010)(NO. 10-762); Ciprofloxacin Hydrochlide Antitrust Litig.,
544 F.3d 1323 (Fed. Cir. 2008). Arkansas Carpenters rejected an antitrust challenge to a $400
million settlement paid by pioneer to a generic producer not to market a generic version of
ciprofloxacin. See Judge Pooler’s lengthy dissent from the denial of rehearing en banc.625 F.3d 779
(2d Cir. 2010) (dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc). See also Androgel Antitrust Litigation,
2010-1 Trade Cas. ¶76914 (N.D.Ga. Feb. 22, 2010); K-Dur Antitrust Litig., 2010-1 Trade Cas.

3
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Eleventh Circuit would apply a rule of reason.12 The Federal Trade Commission
has consistently opposed these agreements as unlawful under Section 5 of the
FTC Act.13 The Antitrust Division has recently changed its position and now
regards them as presumptively unlawful as well, or at least as subject to a
truncated rule of reason inquiry.14
Even if the pioneer drug maker’s patent were absolutely invalid the parties
to a Hatch-Waxman infringement suit (the pioneer and the first generic) would
have a strong incentive to settle. In general the amount of the settlements
exceeds the profit expectations that the generic might reasonably anticipate from
its own competitive entry plus the 180 day period of exclusivity. That is to say,
the settlement is a windfall to the generic.15 If the generic enters the market and
the generic and pioneer behave competitively, prices will drop much closer to
production costs and the generic can anticipate a 180 day period of profits at or
perhaps somewhere above the competitive level. After 180 days additional
generics can enter to the extent of market demand and prices will likely fall
further. By contrast, if the two firms settle, only the pioneer will produce, earning
the full monopoly profits that demand for the drug warrants, and the generic will
share in these profits. That is to say, the two firms will share the monopoly rather
than compete with one another, and the settlement will presumably approximate
the returns to a legal two-firm cartel.16 The size of Hatch-Waxman payments

¶76949, 2009 WL 508869 (D.N.J. March 24, 2010) (reverse payment settlement was neither per se
illegal nor subject to rebuttable presumption of illegality requiring a competitive justification for the
payment because the settlement did not exceed the exclusionary scope of the patent and the
infringement lawsuits that preceded it were not objectively baseless); King Drug Co. v. Cephalon,
702 F.Supp.2d 514, (E.D.Pa. 2010) (similar).
12
See Schering Plough, supra, and Valley Drug Co. v. Geneva Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 344
F.3d 1294 (11th Cir. 2003).
13
E.g., Schering Plough, supra.
14
See Brief for the United States, Arkansas Carpenters, supra, available at 2009 WL
2429249.
15
Henry N. Butler and Jeffrey Pau Jarosch, Policy Reversal on Reverse Payments: Why Court
Should not Follow the New DOJ Position on Reverse-Payment Settlements of Pharmaceutical
Patent Litigation, 98 Iowa L.Rev. 57 (2010) (noting this issue; observing, however, the the
availability of reverse payments may in fact increase the number of generic applications and the
overall effect may be greater entry of generic drugs). See also Asahi Glass Co. v. Pentech
Pharm., Inc., 289 F. Supp. 2d 986, 994 (N.D. Ill. 2003) (“A ban on reverse-payment settlements
would reduce the incentive to challenge patents by reducing the challenger's settlement options
should he be sued for infringement, and so might well be thought anticompetitive.”). The HatchWaxman Act regards the generics filing of its drug application as an act of infringement. See 35
U.S.C. 271(e)(1)-(2). As a result it is very likely that the generic has not invested substantial
resources in production at the time the infringement act is triggered.
16
See Tamoxifen Citrate Antitrust Litig., 466 F.3d at 209, noting that if the patent is found
invalid, “the total profits of the patent holder and the generic manufacturer on the drug in the
competitive market will be lower than the total profits of the patent holder alone under a patentconferred monopoly.” Ordinarily the two settling parties maximize profits by dividing the
monopoly proceeds without affecting its size.
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bears this out, with many of them reaching into the several hundreds of millions
of dollars.17
This “windfall” element to the generic is a significant factor. Under the
Hatch-Waxman approach neither party to the patent infringement suit has an
incentive to see the suit through to completion, and this distinguishes these suits
from the ordinary, noncollusive patent infringement action. As a result the degree
of deference that the courts ordinarily give to settlement actions is unwarranted.
The premise of this deference is that both sides have taken litigation risks into
account and the settlement represents a reasonable compromise between a
finding of infringement, in which the defendant takes nothing and pays damages
and a finding of invalidity and noninfringement, in which the patent loses
everything. In the Hatch-Waxman context, by contrast, any significant doubt
about the validity of the patent creates a situation in which both parties can profit
a great deal by entering into the settlement. Indeed, it is more profitable to the
infringement defendant to settle than to win. If the patent has a high likelihood of
being sustained and infringement found, then the pioneer can be expected to be
willing to pay much less.
In the typical infringement case not involving the Hatch-Waxman Act the
parties most frequently settle by an arrangement under which the infringement
defendant procures a license and produces under royalty requirements during
the pendency of the agreement, which typically cannot extend beyond the
expiration of the patent.18 The Patent Act expressly authorizes production
licenses of this sort, quite aside from settlement.19 However, the Patent Act does
not authorize exit payments or other payments by patentees to exclude rivals
from its market. Further, in a conventional settlement with a production license a
high license fee suggests increasing likelihood that the patent was infringed,
while in the Hatch-Waxman context it suggests increased likelihood that the
patent was either invalid or not infringed.
A very high percentage of the pharmaceutical patents subjected to HatchWaxman litigation are found to be invalid or not infringed when courts do reach
the merits of the patent infringement suit itself. This number is as high as 73%
17

E.g., Arkansas Carpenters, 625 F.3d 779, 780 (2d Cir. 2010) (Pooler, j., dissenting) ($400
million settlement). See FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION, PAY-FOR-DELAY: HOW DRUG
COMPANY PAY-OFFS COST CONSUMERS BILLIONS: AN FTC STAFF STUDY 4 (2010), available at
www.ftc.gov/os/2010/01/100112payfordelayrpt.pdf. (estimating consumer costs at $3.5 billion
annually). See also Hemphill, Aggregate Approach, 109 Columbia L.Rev. at 646 (finding 143
settlements on 101 brand-name drugs during the period 1984, when Hatch-Waxman was passed,
through 2008).
18
Brulotte v. Thys, 379 U.S. 29 (1964) (invalidating contract calling for royalties to be paid
beyond expiration of the patent); see 10 PHILLIP E. AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP,
ANTITRUST LAW ¶1782c (3d ed. 2011, in press). See also Carl Shapiro, Antitrust Limits to
Patent Settlements, 34 RAND J. Econ. 391 (2003) (discussing harm caused by settlements that go
beyond patent term).
19
See 35 U.S.C. §261; and see 12 ANTITRUST LAW ¶2044.
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according to one FTC Study.20 This may seem surprising, given that pioneer
pharmaceutical patents on drug molecules are typically seen as among the more
robust patents that are granted.21 However, many and perhaps most of the
patents subject to Hatch-Waxman style litigation are not primary molecule
patents. Rather they are subsequently issued patents on dosage variations,
usage variations, or in some cases changes in the form or manufacturing
process of the drug, and many of these patents are of much more dubious
quality.22 In particular, given that the primary patent already exists, these
variations may not pass patent laws requirements of novelty or nonobvious
subject matter.23
This high risk of invalidity or noninfringement findings suggests two things.
First, it explains why the pioneer drug manufacturer might have a strong
incentive to settle and share the extended profits with the challenging pioneer
20

See FTC, Generic Drug Entry Prior to Patent Expiration (July 2002), available at
http://www.ftc.gov/os/2002/07/genericdrugstudy.pdf. This figure is somewhat higher than for
litigated patents generally, where roughly half of litigated patents are found to be invalid. See
John R. Allison & Mark A. Lemley, Empirical Evidence on the Validity of Litigated Patents, 28
Am. Intell.Prop.L.Assn. Q.J. 185 (1998)
21
E.g., Dan L. Burk and Mark A. Lemley, The Patent Crisis and How the Courts Can Solve it
32-33 (2009).
22
See Aaron S. Kesselhelm and Jerry Avorn, Using Patent Data to Assess the Value of
Pharmaceutical Innovation, 37 J.L.Med. & Ethics 176 (2009) (on “evergreening” of secondary
patents); Rebecca S. Eisenberg, The Role of FDA in Innovation Policy, 13 Mich. Telecomm.
Tech. L. Rev. 345, 347 (2007); Rebecca S. Eisenberg, The Problem of New Uses, 5 Yale J.
Health Pol'y L. & Ethics 717, 727 (2005). Indeed, there is some evidence that Hatch-Waxman
exacerbates the evergreening problem by facilitating relatively minor secondary patenting and
shielding them from more careful post-issuance scrutiny. See Ron A. Bouchard, et al., Empirical
Analysis of Drug Approval-Drug Patenting Linkage for High Value Pharmacueticals, 8 Nw. J.
Tech. & Intell. Prop. 174 (2010); Brook K. Baker, Ending Drug Registration Apartheid: Taming
Data Exclusivity and Patent/Registration Linkage, 34 AM. J.L. & MED. 303, 304-306 (2008);
Mark A. Lemley & Kimberly A. Moore, Ending Abuse of Patent Continuations, 84 B.U. L. REV.
63, 81 (2004) (on evergreening of pharmaceutical patents); Lara J. Glasgow, Stretching the
Limits of Intellectual Property Rights: Has the Pharmaceutical Industry Gone Too Far?, 41 Idea
227 (2001). See also Hemphill, Aggregate Approach, 109 Columbia L.Rev. at 638-639
(describing successive patenting of Lipitor).
23
E.g., Sun Pharm. Indus. V. Eli Lilly & Co., 611 F.3d 1381 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (discussing
obviousness in the context of “double patenting,” or using minor variations in treatment or dosage
to file secondary patents on top of a primary patent); Purdue Pharma Prods. L.P. v. Par Pharm.,
Inc., 377 F.App’x. 978 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (new way of administering established drug invalid for
obviousness); Altana Pharma AG v. Teva Pharmaceuticals USA, Inc., 566 F.3d 999 (Fed. Cir.
2009). See also Banjamin N. Roin, Unpatentable Drugs and the Standards of Patentability, 87
Tex.L.Rev. 503 (2009) (on pharmaceutical evergreening and problems relating to novelty and
nonobviousness); Michael Enzo Furrow, Pharmaceutical Patent Life-Cycle management After
KSR v. Teleflex, 63 Food & Drug L.J. 275 (2008) (similar); Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Pharma’s
Nonobvious Problem, 12 Lewis & Clark 375 (2008); Christine S. Paine, Brand Name Drug
Manufacturers Risk Antitrust Violations By Slowing Generic Production Through Patent
Layering, 33 SETON HALL L. REV. 479, 497-506 (2003).
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rather than risk an invalidity finding. In that sense it “explains” reverse payment
settlements. Second, however, assuming that the invalidity or noninfringement
findings are correct, it also suggests that most of these settlements come with a
very high social cost – namely, continued exclusivity protection that is not
justified under the Patent Act. A reverse payment settlement does nothing to
bring down the price of a pioneer’s drug during its pendency. The generic is not
producing at all. To the extent that any portion of the settlement payment can be
regarded as a variable cost it will presumably be passed on to consumers in the
form of higher, rather than lower, drug prices. That is, as a monopolist’s costs
rise its profit-maximizing price typically rises as well.
Theoretically, a reverse payment settlement that calls for termination and
production by the generic prior to the expiration date of the litigated payment will
bring competition earlier than continued exclusive production under a valid patent
that the generic’s contemplated production would infringe. Issued patents are
presumed to be valid,24 although there is no presumption in favor of the patentee
on questions of infringement. Further, courts are extremely loathe to inquire into
the merits of patent settlements even when they involve agreements that would
be regarded as unlawful under the antitrust laws in the absence of a patent.25
Nevertheless, a rule of virtual per se legality for reverse payment settlements
seems quite inconsistent with Supreme Court precedent that has not hesitated to
examine anticompetitive settlement agreements and occasionally find illegality
when the practices condoned by the settlement agreement, such as price-fixing
or concerted exclusion, are not authorized by the patent act.26 Reverse payment
settlements are in this class of situations.
A rule attaching too much significance to the duration of the settlement
agreement and whether it terminates prior to patent expiration is inadvisable in
any event. The parties can always negotiate a higher payment over a shorter
24

See 35 U.S.C. §282.
See 12 Antitrust Law ¶2046.
26
Id.; and see, e.g., United States v. Singer Mfg. Co., 374 U.S. 174 (1963) (disapproved
settlement agreement involved pooling plus exclusion); United States v. New Wrinkle, Inc., 342
U.S. 371 (1952) (cross-licensing with price restrictions; Hartford-Empire Co. v. United States,
323 U.S. 386, clarified, 324 U.S. 570 (1945) (horizontal customer restrictions); United States v.
Masonite Corp., 316 U.S. 265, 277 (1942) (similar). See also Asahi Glass Co. v. Pentech
Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 289 F. Supp. 2d 986, 991-992 (N.D. Ill. 2003) (Posner, J.):
25

Only if a patent settlement is a device for circumventing antitrust law
is it vulnerable to an antitrust suit. Suppose a seller obtains a patent that
it knows is almost certainly invalid (that is, almost certain not to survive
a judicial challenge), sues its competitors, and settles the suit by
licensing them to use its patent in exchange for their agreeing not to sell
the patented product for less than the price specified in the license. In
such a case, the patent, the suit, and the settlement would be devices—
masks—for fixing prices, in violation of antitrust law.
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period of time and would do so if they could thereby avoid antitrust liability. By
contrast, a settlement that calls for the generic to stay out of the market beyond
the expiration of the patent should be regarded as a per se unlawful market
division.27
Under the Second Circuit’s rule reverse payment settlements are lawful
unless the underlying patent litigation is a “sham”28 or the settlement agreement
goes “beyond the scope of the claims” contained in the patent.29 In one sense, of
course, the settlement does not go beyond the scope of the patent, which claims
a right to exclude from the product and uses that it covers. In another sense,
however, nothing in the Patent Act justifies the exclusion payment, and in this
case the exclusion is a consequence of the payment, not of the patent itself.
Indeed, as the payment becomes higher the presumed quality of the patent is
less, increasing the inference that the exclusion is caused by the payment rather
than the patent itself. Further, a reverse payment is a market division agreement
which is per se unlawful under antitrust law. In this case the payment is not
“ancillary” to anything, because the settling generic is not producing anything. As
noted previously, the Supreme Court has not hesitated to condemn
anticompetitive settlements under the antitrust laws when those agreements
involved naked restraints on trade that the Patent Act did not authorize.
There may be some nonantitrust approaches to this problem.30 One
possible solution is to remove the presumption of patent validity upon the
showing of a high exit payment. The Patent Act states that patents are
presumed to be valid, which means that the burden of proving invalidity rests on
the challenger.31 But the statutory language says nothing about what it takes to
defeat the presumption. In this case, a high exit payment is evidence that the
patentee doubts that the patent will survive a validity test in court. Even with the
presumption removed, however, a court must still determine whether the patent
was valid and infringed, and thus far they have been largely unwilling to do so.
Indeed, one of the driving forces in the debate over the antitrust standard
to be applied is the reluctance of courts to second-guess settlements by
questioning the validity of the underlying patent or its infringement.32 Both the
27

See, e.g., Palmer v. BRG of Georgia, 498 U.S. 46 (1990). On market division agreements
generally, see Ch. 20D.
28
A “sham” lawsuit occurs when the right being asserted is to weak that no reasonable
litigant would have brought the action. See 3 Antitrust Law ¶706 (sham infringement actions).
On “sham” litigation generally, see 2 Antitrust Law ¶205.
29
See Arkansas Carpenters, 604 F.3d at 103 (quoting Cipro III, 363 F.Supp.2d at 540-541).
30
The argument in the following paragraphs comes from Christina Bohannan & Herbert
Hovenkamp, Creation Without Restraint: Promoting Liberty and Rivalry in Innovation, ch. 3
(2011, forthcoming).
31
35 U.S.C. § 282.
32
See 12 Antitrust Law ¶2046; and Herbert Hovenkamp, Mark Janis & Mark A.
Lemley, Anticompetitive Settlement of Intellectual Property Disputes, 87 Minn. L. Rev. 1719,
1725 (2003).
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rule of virtual per se illegality adopted by the Sixth Circuit33 and the rule of virtual
per se legality adopted by the Second Circuit34 are attempt to resolve the
antitrust issue without inquiring into the merits of the infringement suit. A full rule
of reason query almost certainly means an inquiry into patent validity and
infringement. If the patent is valid and infringed by the generic, then even a very
large payment from the pioneer to the generic for the full remaining life of the
patent represents a wealth transfer between these parties but causes social
economic harm only to the extent that the payment increases the pioneer’s costs
and thus may increase its drug price as well. Of course, a patentee who knew
this in advance would be reluctant to make any more than a nuisance value
payment. At the other extreme, a patent that is invalid or not infringed should
invite immediate generic entry, and the delay imposed by the reverse payment
settlement represents both competitive harm and social cost identical to that
which flows from any naked market division agreement. The rules of per se and
presumptive illegality rest on the premise that a very high payment itself is a
strong indicator that the pioneer believes its patent is weak or proof of
infringement unlikely. A property owner ordinarily does not ordinarily need to pay
large sums to trespassers to keep them away. At the same time, there is no
avoiding the fact that the mere availability of large reverse payment settlements
substantially undermines the incentives that the generic has to litigate patent
validity and infringement to their conclusion..
One possible avenue is to regard a high exit payment as a signal of
invalidity, which can then be used to trigger patent reexamination, a process in
which the PTO reconsiders a patent based on prior art that has been newly
brought to the PTO’s attention.35 The PTO’s reexamination is based on the best
evidence available at the time of the examination, and the presumption of validity
does not apply to the reexamination procedure.36 In a patent infringement suit
producing an exit payment the prospective generic entrant will already have filed
its declaration and evidence to the effect that the patent is either invalid or will not
be infringed by the generic.37 The PTO can rely on this evidence and then make
its own decision about the patent’s validity.38
The PTO’s power in a reexamination proceeding is limited, however. For
example, while it has the power to declare that a patent is invalid or to narrow its
33

Cardizem CD Antitrust Litig., 332 F.3d 896 (6th Cir. 2003).
Tamoxifen Citrate Antitrust Litig., 466 F.3d 187, 212-213 (2d Cir. 2006); Arkansas
Carpenters’ Health and Welfare Fund v Bayer AG, 604 F.3d 98 (2d Cir. 2010), pet. for cert.
filed, 79 USLW 3370 (Dec 06, 2010)(NO. 10-762).
35
See the PTO’S MANUAL OF PATENTING EXAMINING PROCEDURE (rev. ed. July, 2010), §§
2200 (ex parte reexamination) and 2600 (optional inter partes reexamination, which permits
persons seeking reexamination greater participation in the process), available at
http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/pac/mpep/index.htm.
36
In re Swanson, 540 F.3d 1368, 1377 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
37
See 35 U.S.C. § 355(j)(3)(B)(iv)(II) (2006).
38
This is a variation of a proposal made in Gregory Dolin, Reverse Settlements as Patent
Invalidity Signals, 24 HARV. J.L. & TECH. (forthcoming 2011).
34
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claims, it cannot decide questions of infringement. Further, its power to revisit
validity is largely limited to issues of novelty and nonobviousness, which require
a reexamination of prior art. Finally, while reexamination typically involves a
much closer look than the original patent granting process, it is undertaken by the
same agency and under the same rules. As a result, any biases in the PTO in
favor of granting patents or of reading prior art too narrowly, will remain.
Nevertheless, reexamination is hardly a paper tiger. Statistics gathered in
2010 indicate that roughly 25% of patents subjected to ex parte examinations are
completely confirmed; 10% are completely cancelled; and about 2/3 see their
claims changed. By contrast, in inter partes reexamination, a more adversarial
processes, 60% of the patents were cancelled and 35% saw their claims
changed.39 An even higher percentage of patents are cancelled in inter partes
reexamination than are declared invalid in litigation.
Two things must happen to make the automatic reexamination route work,
or at least testable as a mechanism for resolving this problem.
First,
identification of a large reverse payment settlement could trigger a request by an
appropriate federal agency (FTC or FDA) for inter partes reexamination. This
would not require new legislation. In that proceeding the agency, not the settling
generic whose interests are compromised, would be the party opposing the
patent. The statute permits “any third party requester” to request an inter partes
reexamination.40 Second, however, in order to be a more complete solution the
scope of reexamination must be broadened. The current statute permits
reexamination only “on the basis of any prior art,” which largely restricts
reexamination to questions of novelty and nonobviousness. “Off the record”
defects such as the on sale bar cannot ordinarily be attacked in reexamination.
Presumably the great majority of invalid secondary drug patents fail for lack of
novelty or obviousness, the two inquiries that reside in prior art, but not all do.
Once a patent survives reexamination it is still subject to challenge in litigation
but is presumably much stronger than when initially issued, and inter partes
reexamination is itself an adversarial proceeding.
Not all settlement agreements have
remand from the Valley Drug decision the
motion for summary judgment, and once
payment settlement per se unlawful.41 The

been validated. For example, on
district court granted the plaintiff's
again found the defendants' exit
court applied a three-part test “to

39

See Alan W. Kowalchyk and Joshua P. Graham, Patent Reexamination, 3 LANDSLIDE 47
(Sep./Oct. 2010).
40
35 U.S.C. §311.
41
Terazosin Hydrochloride Antitrust Litig., 352 F. Supp. 2d 1279 (S.D. Fla. 2005), on
remand from Valley Drug Co., Inc. v. Geneva Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 344 F.3d 1294 (11th Cir.
2003). See 12 Antitrust Law ¶2046c2. The summary judgment grant by the district court settled
the issue of illegality of the settlement agreement but left for trial questions about the plaintiffs'
injury and damages. See also K-Dur Antitrust Litig., 2009 WL 508869 (D.N.J. Feb. 6, 2009),
report and recommendation adopted, 2010 WL 1172995 (D.N.J. 2010) (reverse payment
settlement agreement with generic rivals did not restrain trade because (a) it did not exceed scope
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of patent given that patentee had right to exclude rivals in any event; and (b) the patent
infringement suit leading up to settlement was not shown to be a sham; refusing to apply
approach suggested by Herbert Hovenkamp, Mark D. Janis & Mark A. Lemley, Anticompetitive
Settlement of Intellectual Property Disputes ("Hovenkamp"), 87 Minn. L. Rev. 1719, 1753
(2003); Andrx Pharmaceutical, Inc. v. Elan Corp., PLC, 421 F.3d 1227 (11th Cir. 2005)
(allegations that pioneer and first generic entered an agreement under which first generic would
never produce, thus excluding other generic firms from market indefinitely, stated cause of action
under both §1 and §2 of the Sherman Act: “Andrx did sufficiently state a claim under both §1 and
§2 of the Sherman Anti-Trust Act that Elan's settlement agreement with SkyePharma, coupled
with SkyePharma's putative agreement not to market, violated antitrust law.”).
See also Merck & Co., Inc. v. Apotex, Inc., 488 F. Supp. 2d 418 (D. Del. 2007), vacated as
moot, 287 Fed. Appx. 884 (Fed. Cir. 2008), holding that Merck's giving and Apotex's acceptance
of a covenant not to sue settling patent infringement litigation denied the court jurisdiction over
the claim and was thus not a triggering event setting the clock running so that Apotex could enter
the market. The court observed:
Notwithstanding the body of law that mandates dismissal, the court is
sensitive to Apotex's argument that Merck is manipulating the court's
jurisdiction. Indeed, the court must guard its jurisdiction jealously.
Apotex highlights an interesting yet troublesome practice that has
emerged from the interplay of the Hatch-Waxman regulatory scheme,
covenants not to sue, subject-matter jurisdiction, and the typical time
cycle of a patent litigation. This lawsuit exposes the ability of pioneer
drug companies to potentially hold generics at bay by suing them, as they
are authorized to do when a paragraph IV certification is made in an
ANDA, and then granting a covenant not to sue, which divests the court
of subject-matter jurisdiction. In this way, district courts can be viewed
as unwitting agents in a pioneer drug company's ability to defer
competition for as long as possible. As unfortunate as it may be for
Apotex, this is the framework that the Hatch-Waxman Act created. The
legislative history suggests that, in fact, Congress contemplated the use
of covenants not to sue as a means of resolving any controversy created
by the filing of an ANDA:
The provision [a “civil action to obtain patent certainty”]…is
intended to clarify that Federal district courts are to entertain
such suits for declaratory judgments so long as there is a “case or
controversy” under Article III of the Constitution. We fully
expect that, in almost all situations where a generic applicant has
challenged a patent [by filing an ANDA with a paragraph IV
certification] and not been sued for patent infringement, a claim
by the generic applicant seeking declaratory judgment on the
patent will give rise to a justiciable “case or controversy” under
the Constitution. We believe that the only circumstance in which
a case or controversy might not exist would arise in the rare
circumstance in which the patent owner and brand drug company
have given the generic applicant a covenant not to sue, or
otherwise formally acknowledge that the generic applicant's drug
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ensure (1) that the parties did have a bona fide dispute, (2) that the settlement is
a reasonable accommodation, and (3) that the settlement is not more
anticompetitive than a likely outcome of the litigation.”42 The court then found that
there was a substantial question as to the patent's validity.43 In particular, there
was evidence that enforcement of the patent was precluded by the “on-sale
bar.”44 The court ultimately concluded after a lengthy analysis of the on-sale bar
issue that the patent would very likely have been found invalid.45 Further, the
settlement in this case was not one that terminated the litigation; rather, it simply
resolved a preliminary injunction issue but kept the underlying litigation as to
validity alive—howbeit, giving the parties a strong incentive not to pursue it to its
conclusion46:
Here, the Agreement did not revolve or even simplify
Abbott's patent infringement action against Geneva…; to the
contrary, the Agreement tended to prolong that dispute to
Abbott's advantage, delaying generic entry for a longer
period of time than the patent or any reasonable
interpretation of the patent's protections would have
provided.47
In addition,
the remaining provisions of the Agreement, rather than being
catalysts for competition and resolution of litigation, are
comprehensive restraints on Geneva's market entry plans
does not infringe.
149 Cong. Rec. S15885 (Nov. 25, 2003) (remarks of Sen. Kennedy,
ranking member of Senate HELP committee).
Id. at 424-425.
And see Ranbaxy Laboratories Ltd. v. Leavitt, 469 F.3d 120 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (striking down
FDA regulation making manufacturer of generic drug ineligible for 180 days of market
exclusivity if the holder of the new drug application seeks to delist the patent, rather than to
litigate validity or infringement).
42
Id. at 1295, citing Herbert Hovenkamp, Mark D. Janis & Mark A. Lemley, Anticompetitive
Settlement of Intellectual Property Disputes, 87 Minn. L. Rev. 1719, 1727 (2003).
43
See id. at 1298 (“…any construction of the patent's exclusionary scope” “…that fails to
take into account the chances of the patent being held invalid would essentially afford pioneer
drug manufacturers an unbridled power to exclude others without regard to the strength of their
patent rights”).
44
35 U.S.C. §102b, which can operate so as to preclude patent protection if the invention in
the completed form as patented was sold more than one year prior to the filing of the patent
application.
45
Terazosin Hydrochloride, 352 F. Supp. 2d at 1304-1305.
46
Id. at 1309 (“where an agreement involves an interim rather than a final settlement, it is far
more difficult for the litigants to claim that the agreement was ancillary to an efficient disposition
of the litigation”), citing Schering Plough Corp., 2003 WL 22989651 (F.T.C. Dec. 8, 2003).
47
Terazosin Hydrochloride, 352 F. Supp. 2d at 1309.
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that by their very terms far exceed the legal scope of the
patent's provisions.48
The court then found that these factors were sufficient to warrant application
of the per se rule. The court found that the agreement, in which the generic firm
accepted large payments ($4.5 million monthly) for its promise not to compete
with the pioneer firm's product, was a naked restraint. “Further, because of the
regulatory framework under Hatch-Waxman, the Agreement had the additional
effect of delaying the entry of other generic competitors.”49
As noted above, the Eleventh Circuit vacated the FTC's Schering-Plough
decision, which had condemned a reverse payment settlement under the FTC
50
Act. The complex facts can be simplified to these basic ones.51 Schering
produced a potassium supplement called “K-Dur 20,” whose principal ingredient
was potassium chloride, an unpatentable common substance. The patent at
issue covered a material coating that covered the potassium chloride and gave it
time-release properties.52 Two rivals, Upsher and ESI, both sold formulations of
time-release potassium chloride, which they claimed used a different process not
covered by the Schering patent. Schering disagreed and sued the two firms for
patent infringement. These suits were settled under an agreement requiring
Schering to pay Upsher $60 million and ESI $15 million for agreements that the
48

Id.
Id. at 1314. The court also noted that the challenged agreement barred Geneva, the generic,
“from marketing any terazosin hydrochloride product, including those that were not at issue in the
patent case.”
50
Schering-Plough Corp. v. FTC, 402 F.3d 1056 (11th Cir. 2005), cert. denied, 548 U.S. 919
(2006). See also Ciprofloxacin Hydrochloride Antitrust Litig., 363 F. Supp. 2d 514, 534
(E.D.N.Y. 2005), aff’d, 544 F.3d 1323 (Fed. Cir. 2005), cert. denied, 129 S. Ct. 2828 (2009) (exit
payment of $398 million to generic to stay out of market not an unreasonable restraint because its
size suggested that patentee believed that risk that its patent would be found invalid was relatively
low:
However, although direct plaintiffs contend that the amount of the exclusion payment in this
case—$398 million—corresponds to a perceived chance of losing of about 50 percent, in absolute
numbers Bayer's perceived chance of losing would appear to be much lower. How direct
plaintiffs calculated this number is difficult to fathom, especially since they cite Professor
Hovenkamp's explanation of expected gains and losses in analyzing the anti-competitive effects
of exclusion payments, who states: “[I]f the patentee has a 25% chance of losing, it is willing to
pay up to 25% of the value of its monopoly to exclude its competitors without a trial.” Herbert
Hovenkamp, [Mark D. Janis & Mark A. Lemley,] Anticompetitive Settlement of Intellectual
Property Disputes, 87 Minn. L. Rev. 1719, 1759 (2003). Applying this model to Bayer's
situation—plaintiffs submit that Bayer stood to lose more than $1.5 billion in profits if the '444
Patent was invalidated—reveals that Bayer's payment of $398 million translates to a perceived
chance of losing of 26.5 percent. Of course, Bayer's payment to Barr was likely also constrained
by the maximum amount Bayer expected Barr to make if it won the lawsuit, but applying a
straight “expectation” economic analysis to these facts would indicate that Bayer was relatively
confident of its chances of winning at trial.
51
See Schering-Plough, 402 F.3d at 1058-1062; and see the FTC's decision, Schering-Plough
Corp., 2003 WL 22989651 (F.T.C., Dec. 8, 2003).
52
Schering-Plough, 402 F.3d at 1058.
49
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latter two firms would stay out of the K-Dur 20 market. However, Schering also
obtained a license to market a different drug, Niacor, which was under
development at Upsher. That right was subsequently determined to have little
value.
In speaking of the proper mode of antitrust analysis for these agreements the
Eleventh Circuit stated:
We think that neither the rule of reason nor the per se
analysis is appropriate in this context. We are bound by our
53
decision in Valley Drug where we held both approaches to
be ill-suited for an antitrust analysis of patent cases because
they seek to determine whether the challenged conduct had
an anticompetitive effect on the market. By their nature,
patents create an environment of exclusion, and
consequently, cripple competition. The anticompetitive effect
is already present. What is required here is an analysis of
the extent to which antitrust liability might undermine the
encouragement of innovation and disclosure, or the extent to
which the patent laws prevent antitrust liability for such
exclusionary effects. Id. Therefore, in line with Valley Drug,
we think the proper analysis of antitrust liability requires an
examination of: (1) the scope of the exclusionary potential of
the patent; (2) the extent to which the agreements exceed
that scope; and (3) the resulting anticompetitive effects.54
As the court elaborated:
Although we acknowledged in Valley Drug that an
agreement to allocate markets is clearly anticompetitive,
resulting in reduced competition, increased prices, and a
diminished output, we nonetheless reversed for a rather
simple reason: one of the parties owned a patent. We
53

Citing Valley Drug Co. v. Geneva Pharm., Inc., 344 F.3d 1294, 1311 n.27 (11th Cir. 2003),
cert. denied, 543 U.S. 939 (2004).
On remand the district court in Valley Drug had once again applied the per se rule. See
Terazosin Hydrochloride Antitrust Litig., 352 F. Supp. 2d 1279 (S.D. Fla. 2005). The Eleventh
Circuit evidently approved in its Schering-Plough decision:
We note that the case at bar is wholly different from Valley Drug. The critical difference is
that the agreements at issue in Valley Drug did not involve final settlements of patent litigation,
and, moreover, the Valley Drug agreements did not permit the generic company to market its
product before patent expiration. On remand, the district court emphasized that the “[a]greement
did not resolve or even simplify Abbott's patent infringement action…to the contrary, the
Agreement tended to prolong that dispute to Abbott's advantage, delaying generic entry for a
longer period of time than the patent or any reasonable interpretation of the patent's protections
would have provided. Given these material distinctions, the same analysis cannot apply.”
54
Schering-Plough, 402 F.3d at 1065-1066 n.14.
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recognized the effect of agreements that employ extortiontype tactics to keep competitors from entering the market. In
the context of patent litigation, however, the anticompetitive
effect may be no more broad than the patent's own
exclusionary power. To expose those agreements to
antitrust liability would obviously chill such settlements.55
The court then began its analysis of the settlement agreement at issue with
the observation that every patent is presumed valid.56 The Patent Act also
permits patents to be both assigned57 and licensed.58 The court then observed:
Although the FTC alleges that Schering's settlement
agreements are veiled attempts to disguise a quid pro quo
arrangement aimed at preserving Schering's monopoly in the
potassium chloride supplement market, there has been no
allegation that the '743 patent itself is invalid or that the
resulting infringement suits against Upsher and ESI were
“shams.” Additionally, without any evidence to the contrary,
there is a presumption that the '743 patent is a valid one,
which gives Schering the ability to exclude those who
infringe on its product. Therefore, the proper analysis now
turns to whether there is substantial evidence to support the
Commission's conclusion that the challenged agreements
restrict competition beyond the exclusionary effects of the
'743 patent.59
Although it is true that a patent is presumed to be valid, the issue in the
underlying infringement controversy was not whether the patent for K-Dur 20 was
valid, but whether the competing products produced by Upsher and ESI infringed
that patent. As a general matter there is no presumption that a rival technology
infringes a valid patent. Rather, the patentee has the burden of establishing
infringement.60
By the same token, in and of themselves exit payment settlements are
typically not licenses. A common traditional method of settling patent litigation is
for the alleged infringer to purchase a license from the patentee, and of course
such a settlement includes the license. In a reverse payment case, by contrast,
the patentee is simply paying the alleged infringer to stay out of the market, and
not to pursue the question of infringement further through litigation. As a result,
the settlement does not include a license at all, but merely a naked payment to
another to stay out of the payor's market.
The panel rejected the FTC's conclusion that the collateral license for Niacor
55

Id. at 1064.
Id. at 1066, citing 35 U.S.C. §282, and numerous decisions.
57
Schering-Plough, 402 F.3d at 1066, citing 35 U.S.C. §261.
58
Schering-Plough, 402 F.3d at 1067, citing several decisions.
59
Id. at 1068.
60
See, e.g., Kegel Co., Inc. v. AMF Bowling, Inc., 127 F.3d 1420, 1425 (Fed. Cir. 1997).
56
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was in fact a subterfuge, citing evidence in the record that this license was in fact
believed to be valuable at the time. In so doing the court accepted the
interpretation of the evidence given by the administrative law judge rather than
the contrary interpretation subsequently given by the Commission, which
reversed the ALJ's decision.61
To be sure, exposing settlement agreements to antitrust scrutiny chills them,
but that does not mean that every settlement is immune from such scrutiny. In
this case, a rule permitting scrutiny of reverse payments would do no more than
limit agreements calling for such payments. But such payments are of little or no
social utility unless they are intended to offset the nuisance costs of a lawsuit.
Further, what the court did not notice is that all property rights are presumed
valid in the sense that their ownership is not typically questioned in an antitrust
case. Property rights can usually be assigned and licensed; however, this does
not prevent antitrust tribunals from assessing market divisions or other cartel
agreements that cover those rights. Patent rights are property rights and are
treated as such except when the Patent Act or special circumstances making
patent rights distinctive so warrant. For example, for the owner of a building to
license a rival to share a portion of it would almost certainly not be an antitrust
violation; however, for the owner to pay a competitor not to build a competing
facility would very likely be unlawful per se. In sum, IP rights, like all property
rights, come with the rights that they have, but these do not include rights to
violate the antitrust laws unless a more particularized warrant can be found in the
IP statutes or sound policy analysis.
The court's emphasis on the presumption of validity seems to ignore the real
anticompetitive threat of many such disputes, including this one, where the
question is not whether the patent is valid, but rather whether the infringement
defendant's product infringes the patent. While there is a presumption of validity,
infringement must be proven, and reverse settlement payments can provide a
ready vehicle for permitting a patentee and the maker of a (noninfringing)
competing product to cartelize the market. In the case of no infringement the
agreement more closely resembles the naked market division agreement among
owners of competing buildings, rather than the division of a jointly owned one.
In Tamoxifen a pioneer drug manufacturer sued Barr for patent
infringement.62 After the district court held the patent invalid the parties settled
with a scheme under which Barr received a large payment and also a license to
produce an authorized generic, provided that the lower court vacated judgment of
invalidity, which it did. Subsequent challengers were not able to establish
61

Assuming that the record contained evidence that a “reasonable mind might accept as
adequate to support [the Commission's] conclusion,” the court was obliged to accept the
interpretation of the Commission rather than the administrative law judge. See FTC v. Indiana
Federation of Dentists, 476 U.S. 447, 454 (1986).
62
Tamoxifen Citrate Antitrust Litig., 466 F.3d 187 (2d Cir. 2006), cert. denied, 551 U.S. 1144
(2007). For another critique, see C. Scott Hemphill, Paying for Delay: Pharmaceutical Patent
Settlement as a Regulatory Design Problem, 81 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1553 (2006).
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invalidity. The Second Circuit rejected an antitrust challenge, noting its
longstanding encouragement of settlements, and refused to upset the traditional
presumption of patent validity.63 The Second Circuit majority concluded that the
underlying infringement lawsuit was not a sham, and this was sufficient for it to
refuse to disapprove the settlement. Indeed, the majority believed that a rule of
per se legality was essential “even if it leads in some cases to the survival of
monopolies created by what would otherwise be fatally weak patents.”64
A dissenter complained:
Holding that a Hatch-Waxman settlement agreement cannot
violate antitrust laws unless the underlying litigation was a
sham also ill serves the public interest in having the validity
of patents litigated.65 This interest exists because “[i]t is as
important to the public that competition should not be
repressed by worthless patents, as that the patentee of a
really valuable invention should be protected in his
monopoly.” Litigating the validity of drug company patents is
critically important to the general well being in light of the
recent trend toward capping the maximum amounts insurers
and public benefit plans will spend on medications.
A Hatch-Waxman settlement, by definition, protects the
parties' interests as they see them. Whether it also promotes
the public's interest depends on the facts. If the validity of the
patent is clear, and the generic company receives a license
to market the patent holder's product, competition is
increased. However, if, as in this case, the patent has
already been shown to be vulnerable to attack and the
generic manufacturer is paid to keep its generic product off
the market, it is hard to see how the public benefits.
The Hatch-Waxman Act provides an incentive for the
second kind of agreement that other patent laws do not
provide. Patent litigation other than Hatch-Waxman patent
litigation generally proceeds along familiar lines. A patent
holder sues an alleged infringer, and the infringer either
chooses to go to trial to vindicate its view that the patent is
invalid or pays the patent holder money as compensation for
damages the patent holder has suffered or as the price of a
license. In this context, one can perhaps assume that the
parties' relative views on the strength of a patent will result in
a pro-competitive or neutral result. If the patent holder
believes its patent is strong, it will proceed to trial, knowing
63

Tamoxifen, 466 F.3d at 202.
Id. at 212.
65
Citing United States v. Glaxo Group Ltd., 410 U.S. 52, 57 (1973).
64
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that it can collect damages at the end. The generic
manufacturer, if it believes the patent holder's patent is
weak, may be willing to risk damages and market its product
during the litigation, thereby promoting competition. And if
the claims are in relative equipoise, a licensing arrangement
may well result.
In contrast, a generic competitor subject to Hatch-Waxman cannot
enter the market for the first thirty months after litigation is commenced
against it. See 21 U.S.C. §355(j)(5)(B)(iii). In addition, whether its attack
against the patent is strong or weak, the benefit it will obtain by
successfully litigating to the finish is not great. At best, it will obtain 180
days in which it will be the exclusive generic on the market. See 21 U.S.C.
§355(j)(5)(B)(iv). On the other hand, the benefits to the public from the
completion of litigation can be enormous if the generic challenger prevails
as it did, at least initially, here. Once the 180-day exclusivity period is over,
any generic that wishes to market a generic product and that can establish
its product is bioequivalent to the patented product can enter the market,
thus providing increased competition.
Moreover, the thirty-month stay provides an incentive to the patent
holder to pay its generic competitor more than the generic company could
have realized from winning the lawsuit. This is so because once the
settlement is reached and the litigation dismissed, another generic
manufacturer will have to wait at least thirty months after litigation is
commenced against it to begin production. Thus, the patent holder will be
protected against all generic competition for thirty months after the first
lawsuit is terminated. This problem is aggravated when the agreement
between the putative competitors provides that the generic company can
deploy its exclusivity period after sitting on it until another ANDA applicant
attempts to enter the market. These anti-competitive effects—and others
not present in this case—have caused antitrust scholars to propose
various analytical frameworks for determining whether an antitrust
violation has occurred when a patent holder makes a reverse payment to
settle patent litigation. The analytical frameworks proposed vary both as to
burden of proof and as to the evidence necessary to find a reverse
payment illegal.66
In the Federal Circuit’s decision in Ciprofloxacin (Cipro), Barr filed an ANDA
for a generic version of Cipro before the pioneer's patent on the drug and its
method of administration had expired, claiming that the pioneer's patent was

66

Tamoxifen, 466 F.3d at 225-227, citing Herbert Hovenkamp, Mark Janis, and Mark A.
Lemley, Anticompetitive Settlement of Intellectual Property Disputes, 87 Minn. L. Rev. 1719,
1759 (2004); Daniel A. Crane, Ease Over Accuracy in Assessing Patent Settlements, 88 Minn. L.
Rev. 698, 709 (2004); Thomas F. Cotter, Refining the “Presumptive Illegality” Approach to
Settlements of Patent Disputes Involving Reverse Payments: A Commentary on Hovenkamp,
Janis and Lemley, 87 Minn. L. Rev. 1789, 1795-1797, 1802 (2003).
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invalid for obviousness.67 The parties then settled a patent infringement suit,
providing that Barr would not market Cipro under its ANDA until after the patent
in question had expired. In exchange Barr received a payment of $49.1 million
initially, plus subsequent payments totaling $398.1 million. Thereupon followed
litigation against other alleged infringers suggesting that the patent was valid, or
at least colorably valid. The Federal Circuit concluded that an antitrust market
division claim should be tried under the full rule of reason. It rejected the Solicitor
General's view that “an appropriate antitrust analysis ‘should take into account
the relative likelihood of success of the parties' claims, viewed ex ante.’”68 The
Solicitor General accepted in principle the view that the larger the payment, the
more suspicious the patent, thus warranting at least some investigation into the
patent's validity or the question of infringement.69 The Federal Circuit rejected
such an approach:
We disagree that analysis of patent validity is appropriate in
the absence of fraud or sham litigation. Pursuant to statute,
a patent is presumed to be valid, 35 U.S.C. §282, and patent
law bestows the patent holder with “the right to exclude
others from profiting by the patented invention.” Dawson
Chem. Co. v. Rohm & Haas Co., 448 U.S. 176, 215 (1980).
A settlement is not unlawful if it serves to protect that to
which the patent holder is legally entitled—a monopoly over
the manufacture and distribution of the patented invention.
…Thus, the district court correctly concluded that there is no
legal basis for restricting the right of a patentee to choose its
preferred means of enforcement and no support for the
notion that the Hatch-Waxman Act was intended to thwart
settlements….As Judge Posner remarked, if “there is
nothing suspicious about the circumstances of a patent
settlement, then to prevent a cloud from being cast over the
settlement process a third party should not be permitted to
haul the parties to the settlement over the hot coals of
antitrust litigation.”70
The court then held that the exclusion license survived rule of reason scrutiny.
67

Ciprofloxacin Hydrochloride Antitrust Litig., 544 F.3d 1323 (Fed. Cir. 2008), cert. denied
sub nom. Arkansas Carpenters Health and Welfare Fund v. Bayer AG, 129 S. Ct. 2828 (2009).
68
Id. at 1337, quoting the Solicitor General's brief in a Second Circuit decision on which
certiorari had been denied. See Tamoxifen Citrate Antitrust Litig., 466 F.3d 187 (2d Cir. 2006),
cert. denied sub nom. Joblove v. Barr Labs, Inc., 551 U.S. 1144 (2007). In that decision the SG
had argued that the petition should be denied, stating that “[a]lthough the petition presents an
important and difficult question, and the court of appeals adopted an incorrect standard, this case
does not appear to be a good vehicle for resolving the question presented.” SG's brief, available at
2007 WL 1511527.
69
On this point, see 12 ANTITRUST LAW ¶2046c.
70
Cipro, 544 F.3d at 1337, quoting Asahi Glass Co. v. Pentech Pharms., Inc., 289 F. Supp.
2d 986, 992 (N.D. Ill. 2003) (other citations omitted).

19

Hovenkamp

Reverse Payment Settlements

Jan. 2011, page 20

Although Bayer, the patentee, did have market power in the relevant market
there was no evidence that the agreement restricted the challenges of others to
the patent or otherwise restrained competition outside of the patent's ordinary
“exclusionary zone.”71 The essence of the agreement in this case was to keep
someone other than the patentee from practicing the patent until after its
expiration, which was precisely what the patent granted. The court added in a
footnote:
Indeed, a sizable exclusion payment from the patent holder
to the generic manufacturer is not unexpected under the
Hatch-Waxman Act, where the relative risks of litigation are
redistributed.72

71

Cipro, 544 F.3d at 1340.
Id. at 1333 n.11, citing Schering-Plough Corp. v. F.T.C., 402 F.3d 1056, 1074 (11th Cir.
2005), cert. denied, 548 U.S. 919 (2006). See Jessie Cheng, note, An Antitrust Analysis of
Product Hopping in the Pharmaceutical Industry, 108 Colum. L. Rev. 1471 (2008); Thomas
Chen, Authorized Generics: A Prescription for Hatch-Waxman Reform, 93 Va. L. Rev. 459
(2007); Stacey L. Dogan & Mark A. Lemley, Antitrust Law and Regulatory Gaming, 87 Tex. L.
Rev. 685 (2009).
72
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